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Setting the NAACP Flagship's Political Course
by Denton L. Watson

The debate over the relevance of Afrocentrism
demonstrates the considerable progress that has been made
since the 1960s in winning acceptance of black studies as an
essential area of curricula designed to increase knowledge
and understanding of the history, culture and unique
experiences of people of African descent in a white majority
Am.erican society. But while presenting a welcomed
opportunity for fostering a broader study of American
history and society, Afrocentrism, like the multiculturalism
concept, arouses varying degrees of scholarly passion which,
unless properly channelled, could result in compounding past
errors of skewing modern civil rights history by focusing
mainly on the contributions of Dr. Martin Luther King , Jr.,
and his nonviolent philosophy, the student activists in the
South, and on the two most celebrated twentieth century
black nationalist figures, Marcus Garvey and Malcolm X.
Afrocentrism could, despite good intentions, be used to
indoctrinate youngsters in self-serving black ideologies
ostensibly to foster pride in their African heritage but
results in reinforcing damaging inferiority complexes and
social attitudes that make high school and gollege graduates
misfits in the workplace where they must associate and
compete with an increasing number of citizens from other
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than European backgrounds as well as within the context of a
global economy.
Or Afrocentrism could be an essential vehicle for
better preparing students of all race s , but especially
African Americans, the histori cal victims of racial
oppression, for contending with the ever present enemies of
ra c ial progress and for fostering a more constructive
interest in their own history as well as an appreciation for
the richnes s of cultures and historical experiences that are
foreign to their own but which comprise American society. f l
An obvious example of the danger inherent in using
Afrocentrism for ideological indoctrination is the extent,
with rare exceptions, in recent years to which students of
civil rights history have de liberately minimized the
contributions of the National Association for the
Advancement of Co l ored People, which even its most
vociferous detractors readily ack nowledge was the '' flagsh i p "
or "granddaddy" of th e modern c ivil rights movement. This
trend is a significant departure from the intense interest
that scholars earlier displayed in the orga niza tion 's
development, growth and effectiveness through the 1 950s . /2
To a large degree, the skewing of modern c i vil rights
history resulted from a degenerative form of self-serving
compet ition. That selfishness has bred a historiographical
myopia that has ill-served the people, namely African
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Americans, who ostensibly are the intended beneficiaries of
this misguided zeal. The result is that African Americans
are left primarily with the two historical pionee rs, the
NAACP and the National Urban League (found e d as a social
organization with the primary objective of securing jobs for
blacks). The NAACP's youthful competitors (the Congress of
Racial Equality, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee) now exist, if at all, largely in name only, as
shadows of their once vigorous selves in a pe riod that is as
socially challenging as the ear ly 1 960s when they
flourished, and their daring and vision commanded the
attention of the nation and the world./3
Unlike those organizations, which utilized the tactics
of confrontation through demonstrations to implement their
nonviolent philosophy , the NAACP implemented its
humanitarian and constitutional (egalitarian) philosophy
along two distinct but related courses, which were legal and
political. The difference between the related egalitarian
and nonviolent strategies was that while the NAACP sought
change from within the established lega l and political
systems, the younger organizations, seeing these avenues of
redress as too slow or unyielding, provoked confrontations
by deliberately violating accepted practices.
The NAACP's political strategy is to be examined along
four principal paths: its agitation for developing public
opinion against racial injustices, such as l ynchings;
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its struggle to enfranchise blacks and mobilize their votes
as an effective weapon; its struggle for presidential
leadership to uphold the Constitution; and its struggle for
the adoption of constructive policies by federal agencies.

#
Founded at the turn of the century out of the twin
currents of the racial militancy voiced by Dr. W.E.R. nu
Bois and the spirit of eighteenth century liberalism that
gave birth to the nation and its Constitution, the NAACP
charted a radical course and progressively modified its
programs without deviating from its goal of full social and
political equality for African Americans. From the
beginning, it has adhered to a humanitarian and
constitutional philosophy. The first part of its founding
vow, expressed in 1906 at the second meeting of the Niagara
Movement at Harpers Ferry, to wage an uncompromising
struggle, held that:
We shall not be satisfied with less than our full
manhood rights.
. We claim for ourselves every
right that belongs to a free-born American -political , civil , and social -- and until we get these
rights, we shall never cease to protest and assail the
ears of America with the story of its shameful deeds
toward us.
That statement was Du Bois's clarion response to the
type of compromise with segregation that Booker T.
Washington had advocated in his famous Atlanta Compromise
speech of 1895 and to which the nation had become
accustomed. With his publication of The Souls of Black Folk
in 1903, Du Bois had launched his uncompromising challenge
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to Washington ' s dominance as leader of his people and to his
positi on that blacks should not seek political power or
higher education . Not only would the NAACP advocate the
enfranchisement of blacks and their use of the ballot to
ac hi eve t h eir goals , as well as den i grate Washi n gton ' s
advocacy of in dustr i al education for the race, but it would
also challenge Washington as the principal political force
in the civil rights struggle . /4
I n 1908 , after witnessing the brutal treatment of
blacks in Springfield, Illinois , Wi lliam Engl i sh Walling, a
whit e Kentuckian of slaveholding heritage but who h ad
acquired a world view and was a socialist , sou nded the
pai nful cry for h elp and a reaffirmation of the humanitarian
concern that l ed to th e birth of the NAACP :
Ei ther the spirit of Lincoln and Lovejoy must be
revived and we must come to treat the Negro on a plane
of abso l ute political and soc i al equality, or Vardaman
and Tillman will soon have transferred the race war to
the North.
. Yet who realizes the seriousness of the
s ituat i on , and wh at large and powerful body of citizens
is ready to come to their a i d !
Mary Wh ite Ovington did . A social worker who had been
Du Bois 's only white g u est at Harpers Ferry, she responded
t0 Wa lling's call. She , Wa lli ng a n d Henry Moskovitz , another
white socialist, began planning for creating an organization
to deal with what they considered to be "the Negro
question. " Those three whites -- one a descendant of an
abo lition i st, the other a Jew, and the southerner
the princi pal founders of the NAACP.

were
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Two other members of that core group were Charles
Edward Russell, another socialist whose father had been an
abolitionist editor of a small newspaper in Iowa, and Oswald
Garrison Villard, grandson of William Lloyd Garrison, the
Boston abolitionist, and publisher of the New York Evening
Post. Ovington also invited two blacks, Bishop Alexander
Walters of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, and
the Reverend William Henry Brooks, minister of St. Mark's
Methodist Episcopal Church, to join the discussions on the
need for an organizational response to the racial problem .
They were among the sixty people (53 whites and seven
blacks) who signed a "Call" written by Villard for a
conference on the racial problem that was issued on
Lincoln's birthday in 1909, which marked the founding of the
NAACP. The founders demanded, irrespective of color, all
rights "which underlie our American institutions and are
guaranteed by our Constitution" -- equality of opportunity,
equality before the law, equality in education, an end to
disfranchisement, abolition of racial segregation, and an
end to mob violence .
The NAACP adopted the Niagara Movement's program when
Du Bois merged with the new organization in 1910 by joining
its staff as director of publications and research and
becoming one of its officers. That year he founded The
Crisis as the NAACP 's official journal and became its
editor , a position in which he served until 1934./5
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While the white founders of the NAACP worked to develop
an effective organization of protest, Du Bois used The
Crisis to expose the scourge of racial oppression and to
educate both his black and white audience through the use of
journalistic propaganda. "The American Negro," he reiterated
in 1915, "demands equality" in all its forms -- political,
industrial, that is jobs and economic opportunity, and
social -- "and he is never going to rest satisfied with
any t hing less." His approach for achieving those goals was
through "persistent demand," for it was only by such
expression, he said, "can any people show a real pride of
race and a decent self-respect . "/6
Du Bois's proposal involved what he called "both
negative and positive sides" of the struggle. The negative
side involved removal of injustices, or the shackles to
political, industrial and social freedom. The positive side ,
or second stage of the struggle was the empowerment of the
group as full American citizens. As he said:
The Negro must have power; the power of men, the right
to do, to know to feel and to express that knowledge,
action and spiritual gift. He must not simply be free
from the political tyranny of white folk, but must have
the right to vote and to rule over the citizens, white
and black, to the extent of his proven foresight and
ability. He must have a voice in the new industrial
democracy which is building and the power to see to it
that his children are not in the next generation
trained to be the mudsills of society.
To fulfill this goal, Du Bois maintained, "we must
first make American courts either build up a body of
decisions which will protect the plain legal rights of
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American citizens or else make them tear down the civil and
political rights of all citizens in order to oppress a few."
Next, African Americans must seek remedial legislation
in Congress , national aid to public school education,
removal of all legal discrimination based on race and color.
Third, there must be an increase in contacts between the
races to foster understanding among all humans. Fourth, he
maintained, "only the publication of the truth repeatedly
and incisively and uncompromisingly can secure that change
in public opinion which will correct these awful lies" of
inferiority about his race./7
Du Bois devoted The Crisis to propagating racial pride
an~ nationalism and to winning popular acceptance of those

goals , which became the principal elements of the modern
civil rights movement. He was thus much more than the sage
of twentieth century black intellectual thought; he was the
father of the movement.
By temperament, inclination and training, Du Bois was
not a leader of people. Neither was he a politician; but his
fearless advocacy of a philosophy of racial egalitarianism
established the tone of militancy that was essential for the
development of the NAACP's political strategy . Furthermore,
he believed that the "great blow -- the freeing of ten
million"

would not occur until the new organization had

enlisted the support of the masses . Du Bois was an educator
and a propagandist who was uncompromising in his beliefs and
mission and won respect by the mere force of his
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intellegence and ideas. His confrontational approach was
essential to the political effectiveness of the NAACP. He
enjoyed stirring up controversies, which effectively drew
attention to his egalitarian philosophy and his theoretical
blueprints for change. Under his leadership, The Crisis grew
to a circulation of 30,000 and was the most influential
journal of its kind./8
Three events of 1915 defined the NAACP's direction more
clearly and helped to properly establish it as a dominant
protest organization. The showing of the Birth of a Nation,
a film by David W. Griffith that was based on Thomas Dixon's
novel the Clansman, was a production success but a gross
depiction of blacks in the Reconstruction period that was
designed to arouse the basest of racist passions and the
northerners who were protecting blacks in the South. The
film glorified the Ku Klux Klan, depicting its members as
noble rescuers of white women from ignorant, lustful black
men.
Birth of a Nation provided the NAACP with its first
opportunity to launch a campaign against the forms of
dangerous racist stereotypes that inspired lynchings in the
South, and the organization leaped to the challenge. Villard
fired the first slavo in the battle to stop the showing of
the film by refusing to accept a lengthy, and thus
profitable, advertisement that its promotors offered the
Evening Post. Ovington and Moorfield Storey, the NAACP's
president from Boston who was once secretary to Senator
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Charles Sumner, joined the struggle by expressing their
outrage over the film and sought its withdrawal, but to no
avail.
Birth of a Nation was enormously successful even
though, as Ovington noted, "[p] o litical power kept it out of
the State of Ohio. " A probable reason was that the
underground movement had been strong in that state and the
NAACP was able to arouse quiet sympathies for blacks. Also ,
the governor of Pennsylvania, at one time, forbade the
film's showing in his state because it libeled one of its
great statesmen, Congressman Thaddeus B. Stevens, who like
Sumner was a Radical Republican standbearer in the struggle
during Reconstruction for passage of civil rights laws.
Ovington recalled the f rustration of trying to get the
film withdrawn : "After one production was over and we
thought it gone, a revival would be advertised . It must have
been a decade before it ceased to educate our children on
the southern conception of the Negro. " For her, the salutary
experience was that the campaign helped the NAACP's branches
to "d evelop a technique of resistance , and their hectoring
had a considerable nuisance value " that would become
important to the organization ' s future politica l strategy./9
But if Birth of a Nation cast a pall over the black
community , the Supreme Court ' s ruling in Gu inn v . United
States in June 1915 convinced the NAACP of the importance of
pursuing the type of legal course that Du Bois advocated.
The Supreme Court ruled that the grandfather clause , which
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had been used to keep blacks from voting, was
unconstitutional. The NAACP had gotten the Oklahoma attorney
general to challenge the constitutionality of a 1910
amendment to the state constitution waiving the electoral
literacy requirements for those whose forebears could vote
before the Civil War. With the attorney general's approval,
Moorfield Storey presented an amicus curae brief in the case
and participated in arguments before the Supreme Court. Even
though it did not end disfranchisement of blacks in the
South, Guinn was a resounding moral victory for the NAACP
and encouraged it to develop a legal program.
By November 14, 1915, when Booker T. Washington died,
the NAACP had begun to work along the political and legal
courses that would define its two principal strategies for
seeking full equality for African Americans. Washington's
death ended the bitter conflict between the conservatives
and radicals and made the NAACP the indisputable leader of
the civil rights struggle -- a cutting edge role it would
play until the explosion of the sit-in demonstrations in the
South in 1960, when a new generation of activists brought a
moral tone to the movement./10
#
Du Bois's inimicable personality as well as the fact
that by 1920 he was well established as an unyielding force
in the struggle for racial equality enabled him to
overshadow James Weldon Johnson, a former newspaperman, a
celebrated writer and poet who became the NAACP's executive
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secretary that year, effectively establishing a permanent
line of black leaders of the organization. As the NAACP's
field secretary for the previous four years, Johnson had
devoted himself to significantly expanding the NAACP branch
in the South because, as he explained, he felt the region
"could furnish the numbers to make the organization a
power." Previously, the NAACP was primarily a northern
organization. While the NAACP expanded its programs,
especially by seeking the cooperation of local governments
in ending discrimination, the passage of legislation, and
presidential leadership for the protection of the rights of
African Americans, the branches would become its principal
organizational and power base and play an ever increasing
role in mobilizing grassroots political support./11
Security of person from violence was the most pressing
problem that the organization faced in its early years.
Between 1900 and 1910 there were an average of 100 lynchings
a year, so the NAACP made the antilynching struggle its
earliest sustained program. The NAACP's primary strategy
involved waging a publicity campaign in the press, with
pamphlets and in-depth studies, and other educational
activities to mobilize public support for ending the crime.
In 1917 it led its celebrated silent protest parade of
15,000 men, women and children down New York's Fifth Avenue
with muffled drums to protest the extremely violent riots
against blacks in East St. Louis, Illinois, that year and
discrimination in general. The NAACP's widespread publicity
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of the East St. Louis riots spurred Congressman L . C . Dyer of
Missouri to begin efforts to win passage of antilynching
legislation in the House./12
Th e NAACP intensif i ed the campaign th e following yea r,
when it got Preside nt Wilson, with whom it was waging a
r e lentl e ss but unsuccessful battle against h is introduction
of segregation in the federal government, to issue an appeal
to:
the governors of all the states, the law officers of
every community and, above all, the men and women of
every community in the United States, all of whom
r eve re America and wish to keep her name without stain
or reproach, [to) cooperate , not passively merely, but
actively and watchfull, t o make an end to this
disgraceful evil.
Wilson a dded that lynching " cannot live wh ere the community
doe s not countenance it." That the NAACP could have gotten
that much of a respons e from Wilson indicated the potency of
the l ynch ing i ssue . /13
In 19 18 also, t h e NAACP hired Walter Wh ite, a young
blond, blue - eyed Afr i can American insurance execut i ve from
Atl a nta , to direct its investigation of l ynching in the
South, a program in which Johnson and other NAACP staffers
still pa rticip ated. In add i t i on a lso to featuring stories on
l y n c hings in Th e Cr i sis , the NAACP in 1919 published Thirty
Years of Lyn c hing in the United States , 1889-1918 , to serve
as the basis for its expanded campaign .
At the same time, Johnson threw the NAACP ' s weight
be hind Dyer's efforts in Cong r ess to win passage of an
ant il ync hing bill, which was the fore ru nner of several
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others. The House p a ssed the Dyer bill in 1922, but the
southerners killed it in the Senate with the filibuster. The
NAACP nevertheless placed full and half-page advertisements
graphically detailing the crime in several daily newspapers
that year. The ads were so compelling that a Pacific Coast
daily ran one without cost. The British picketed against the
crime in Londoners, while newspapers as far way as in
Sydney, Australia, ran articles on the crime. In the United
States, books and a steady flow of magazine articles on the
issue maintained the drumbeat of antilynching public
opinion./14
The missionary zeal that reinforced its political
skills helped the NAACP to also win support for its message
that African Americans were human beings and American
citizens with the same inalienable rights that the majority
population treasured. The NAACP relentlessly increased the
pressure year by year even though Congress just as
stubbornly refused to pass an antilynching bill. The measure
of the campaign's success was that while in 1919 hardly
anyone of prominence would speak out against the crime, in
1938 when southern senators again killed the last bill with
the filibuster, hardly anyone of influence dared to defend
lynching publicly. The NAACP so completely aroused public
opinion against the crime that the southern states
themselves ended it./15
Once more, Roy Wilkins, who had joined the staff in
1931 as assistant executive secretary, proclaimed that the
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goal was "equality before the law, equality in security of
the person, equality in human dignity." The NAACP did not
completely end the campaign; it merely moved on to more
comprehensive programs to obtain full constitutional
protection for blacks./16 (Although Congress did not pass an
antilynching bill, the NAACP got it to include protections
against civil-rights-related violence in the 1960 Civil
Rights Act and the 1968 Fair Housing Act .)
The NAACP's political campaign was reinforced by its
case- by-case development of a legal program through which it
sought protection for Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
rights of its primary constituents . Repeatedly, the NAACP
scored significant constitutiona l v i ctories before the
Supreme Court in its attacks on residential segregation
ordinances, restrictive housing covenants , disfranchisement,
including the discriminatory use of the poll tax, and for
due process.
One of these landmark rulings came in 1923 in a case
that arose out of the famous Elaine, Arkansas

(Phillips

County), riots that erupted when black farmers sought
equality in the body politic -- that is, a fair accounting
from plantation owners of their cotton crops. This case,
Moore v . Dempsey, covering 79 defendants involved questions
of mob violence, mob domination of court procedure, service
of blacks on juries, and the enforcement of contracts. Had
the NAACP not won the case, blacks in the future would not
have dared to demand those basic rights that whites
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considered essential to the conduct of their normal affairs;
neither would they have dared to shoot back in self defense,
as they did from a small black church at Hoop Spur in
October 1919, when whites attacked them. The blacks'
determination sparked the riots./17

#
"The various social movements which have arisen among
Negroes from the eighteenth century until the present,"
wrote E. Franklin Frazier in The Negro in the United States,
"have emerged during periods of crises when the relations of
the Negro to American society was undergoing changes."
Frazier continued:
The character of these social movements has been
determined by the extent to which various strata in the
Negro population have been affected by the changing
relation of the Negroes to American life. In most of
the social movements leaders have appeared who have
made articulate the aspirations and hopes of Negroes or
the new definitions of their place in American
society./18
The depression that began with the massive stock market
crash of 1929 was one of those periods of crises, which
changed the character of the civil rights movement by
unleashing new political ideologies and arousing interest
among a new generation of black militant intellectuals in
the power of mass action. The depression created a strong
awareness of the marginal status of African Americans. The
National Urban League reported in 1931 that in 106 cities,
with few notable exceptions, the proportion of unemployed
blacks was from 30 to 60 percent greater than for whites./19
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This in creas ing de t erioration of the African American ' s
economic position forced the NAACP in 1932 to reexamine its
strategy and to shift its programs so as to emphasize the
economic needs of the mass es . This shift was also encouraged
by the hopes that the New Deal's emphasis o n the "forgotten
man" have African Americans . In addition to girding itself
for launching an a ll-out l ega l campa i gn the NAACP reasserted
the understanding that h ad been voiced at i ts founding
conference that one of its primary concerns was economic
security for the race. "We are becoming concerned ," the
NAACP sa id in 1932, "that we are ab l e to accomp li sh so
little.

. We are going to co ntinue to agitate.

. But

we beli eve what the Negro needs primarily is a defi ni te
economic program."/20
James Weldon Johnson left the NAACP t o take a c h air in
creative litera ture at Fisk Universi t y , and Walter White
s u cceeded him in 1 93 1 as executive secretary. White
recognized that
a n enormous cha nge h as taken place in Negro thinking
since the World War [I]. More and more the Negro h as
re a lized that the problem he e n cou nters in the United
States is only a part of the whol e st ru ctur e of race
prejudice which the modern age of i mper i alism has
created. The st irrings of thought and unrest in Afr i ca,
As i a, a nd th e Far East of black and brown a n d yellow
races have not been without their counterpart in the
United St ates./21
His own role as a civil rights leader, White told one
person, was "to get the facts o n d i scrimination and then to
protest morning , noon a nd night to those i n authori t y .
Only those who continu e to raise a r acket in season and o ut
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. are going to escape being given the rawest of
dE7als."/22
These sentiments and intense reexamination of
strategies for racial equality showed why the decade of the
1930s was the most important period in the development
development of the civil rights movement and in refining the
NAACP's programs and strategies.
On one front, the NAACP conducted a comprehensive
reevaluation of its case, by case legal work, which was
being done as the need arose and without a clear strategy.
Those efforts led to the establishment of the organization's
legal department in 1935, when Charles Ham il ton Houston, the
noted dean of the Howard University Law School , was hired as
its spec i al counsel and first staff lawyer. That same year ,
Houston and Thurgood Marshall, his protege working with the
Baltimore NAACP Branch, won a case in which the Baltimore
City Court ordered the University of Maryland Law School to
admit Donald Gaines Murray, a 21 -year -o ld Amherst College
graduate, as its first black student. That case, Murray v .
Maryland, launched the epic constitutional battle in which
the NAACP would directly challenge the practice of
segregation that the Supreme Court had sanctioned by its
1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision establishing the "separate
but equal" doctrine./23
On the other front, the federal government's entry into
the economic life of the nation when it began to perform
social services gave blacks an unprecedented opportunity to
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seek its protection of their cons tituti o nal rights through
the political process . African Americans saw the New Dea l as
an occasion for beginning an intense debate over future
programs and strategies for the betterment of the race. As
Ralph J. Bunche, the noted Howard Unive r sity political
scientist pointed out, "the New Deal for the first time gave
broad recognition to the existence of the Africa n American
as a national problem and undertook to give special
consideration to this fact in many ways, though the basic
evils remained untouched." By becoming the driving force in
rebuilding the nation's social and economic structure, the
federal government provided the opportunity and incentive
for the NAACP to more clearly define and expand both its
legal and its political strategies. /24
An obvious problem was that blacks were politically
weak and poorly organized. One reason was that 56 percent of
the total black population lived in rural areas, and about
40 percent of black wage earners were engaged in some
agricultural work. The immediate problem that blacks
encountered, therefore, was that while the New Deal was
meant to solve the nation's economic crisis through
democratic means, because they lacked political and economic
power, blacks received only minima l benefits from the new
programs; only those groups that were best organized
received the greatest benefits./25
Walter White, nevertheless, was not daunted by the
political weakness of blacks. He showed in 1930 that
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properly organized, blacks could influence the course of the
national government. His first concrete test of this resolve
was the vigorous campaign he organized to successfully block
by a 39 to 41 vote in the Senate President Hoover's
nomination of Judge John J . Parker , a South Carolina racist,
to the Supreme Court. White was especia lly aware that in
1912 President Taft heeded the NAACP ' s protest and withdrew
his nomination of Judge William C. Hook to the Supreme Court
because of h i s racist record , but President Hoover angrily
refused to do the same in the case of Judge Parker. White
exp l a i ned in his autobiography, the " Parker fight was
recognized as t h e political coming of age of the
hitherto-ignored Negro voters ."
Next, t h e NAACP campaigned through 1936 for the defeat
of the senators who voted for Parker's confirmation .
Previous l y , the NAACP had neither supported nor opposed
po li tica l cand i dates . That was no easy task, White
explained, because, even th o ugh the NAACP had blocked the
n omination, "the Negro was still the object of derogation
a lmost to the point of contempt on the part of politicians ."
Despi t e the fear of fail u re, which would have worsened the
contempt , the NAACP publi c l y announced its intention to
defeat several senators and followed through on its threat.
Of this success, White explained :
Out of these effective hard- hitting and
uncompromising campaig ns two changed political
attitudes came . White politican s, Republican and
Democratic, did not like the new situation, but were
forced to recognize that the Negro voter no longer was
g ull ib l e, purchasable , or complacent as before and
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would have to be recognized as an increasing potent
force in the American political scene.
The second benefit was that blacks found new hope and
dign it y in the victory. Previously , White explained, " their
efforts had been crowned at best with purely 'moral'
victories .'' I t also pleased White that subsequently J udge
Parker ' s rulings on cases involving the interests of blacks
and labor were "beyond reproach in their strict adherence
not only to the law but to the spirit of the
Constitution."/26
Several years later, White would again lead the NAACP
in flexing its muscles to send a telling message to another
branch the government. This it did by getting th e United
States Senate to remove Tehodore Gilmore Bilbo, the arch
segregationist from Mississippi, from its midst . At the
urging of the NAACP, Bilbo's fellow senators charged him
with misu s i ng his office to violate the Constitution and
federa l

laws by flagrantly perve rting the electoral process

in his state. White submitted to the special Senate Campaig n
Investigating Committee an exhaustive report showing how
Bilbo h ad won renomination in the J u ly 2, 1946, Mississi pp i
primary by intimidating black voters. That the Senate would
uphold such a charge against a member of the one-party So uth
and bar him from taking his seat showed how much progres si v e
thought was seeping into the legislative body . But it still
required the NAACP's determined agitation to win the
battle . /27
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The difficulty of mobilizing political strength to
benefit from progressive currents was shown in the struggle
to get the New Deal agencies, notably the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration and the National Recovery
Administration , to accord blacks equal treatment. Despite
its strenuous effort , the NAACP was unable to win any
appreciable improvement in the treatment of blacks by the
AAA and the NRA and in other New Deal programs. The
experience of this struggle led the NAACP to declare its
determination "to resist to the utmost any and all forms of
segregat ion and discrimination in the federal government" -a position that would be voiced with much more intensity in
coming years as it expande d its strategy of political
agitation . /28
By 1935, black leaders fully concurred that the federal
government was paying insufficient attention to the special
problems of the group and that the New Deal programs were
failing to address their economic conditions. As Raymond
Wolters notes in his Negroes and the Great Depression, one
of the most helpful studies of the NAACP's struggles in this
period, blacks therefore shifted their focus "away from th e
question of how to influence government programs directly
and centered" their enege ries instead on how they "could
best organize themselves as a powerful interest group that
no government could afford to ignore." / 29
Young militants such as Abraham L. Harris, a Howard
University professor who headed a Committee on Future Plan
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and Program for the NAACP national board of directors, and
John P. Davis, head of the activist Joint Committee o n
National Recovery, which the Association sup ported
financially, now argued strenuously that the NAACP should
abandon its traditional preference for education, agitation,
litigation, and congressional lobbying and support instead
mass programs for the economic betterment of the race. Led
by White, the NAACP's established leaders refused to follow
t~at

course. White did move the NAACP to the left to include

some features of the militants's program and remained
sympathetic to their efforts. But apart from his personal
predispositions that made him resist going further, he fully
appreciated the basic strength of the NAACP's humanitarian
and constitutional philosophy. As history confirmed, his
decision to continue the organization's drive for racial
equality along the established legal and political courses
was one of the most important of his career./30
No one enjoyed the challenge of political contests more
than Walter White, and few were as well equipped with his
type of gregarious personality and natural gift for public
relations to lead the NAACP in this area. White's style
included establishing friendships on a first name basis with
the most influential leaders of government and society, on
whom he frequently called for assistance .
One of his most celebrated friendships was that with
Eleanor Roosevelt to whom he frequently turned to get his
message directly to her husband the President. Mrs.

The NAACP , page 24

Rooseve l t ' s support was crucial because, as White explained,
he quick l y came to realize that "the President was frankly
unwi l ling to challenge the Southern leaders of his
party. " /31
As a member of the NAACP nat i onal board of d i rectors ,
Mrs. Rooseve l t

remained fully attu ned to the thinking of

blacks and worked tirelessly to influence the course of
government for their benefit. One noteworthy challenge for
her , therefo r e , was the refusal in 1939 by the Daughters of
the Amer i can Revolutio n to permit Mar ian Anderson or any
other black artists to appear i n Constitu tion Hall.
Mrs . Roosevelt protested the decision by resigning f r om
the DAR . White was very sympathet i c to her dilemma because
her stand increased the southerners ' attacks on her for her
forthright support of civil rights; but he was also excited
over the prospect of the " demonstration of democracy" that
the effor ts to find an alternative open air site in
Washington for a free concert posed. Wi th President
Roosevelt ' s b l essings , the Department of the Interior
approved the use of the Lincoln Memorial as an alternative
site for the concert by the exceptionally gifted singer, and
this was he l d under the auspices of the NAACP . In concluding
the arrangements , White was particularly aware of the
diffic u lty that many of his white supporters faced because
the NAACP was known as " a fighting propaganda agency," and
that its sponsorship would " create the impression that
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propaganda for the Negro was the objective instead" of
emphasizing the principle of holding the concert itself.
As always, White relished another victory over bigotry.
Nothing made him happier, however, than Anderson's
exquisitively beautiful performance, which brought tears of
joy streaming down a young girl's face in the audience.
White saw a message in the girl's face that said: "If Marian
Anderson could do it .

. then I can, too."/32

#
Hitler's blitzkriegs throughout Europe in late 1939 and
1940 precipitated even more fundamental challenges than
those that had preoccupied the nation during the Depression
years. Survival of not just an economic system but also of
Western democratic values and America's system of government
was now at stake. The intertwining of international with
domestic currents, notably the dramatic migration of blacks
and poor whites from southern and rural farms to urban
industrial centers, created new social pressures and
political realities, which in turn led to new employment
opportunities for minorities that surpassed those of any
period since Reconstruction. Thus the three developments
most beneficial to civil rights were the increasing
political strength of blacks outside the South; the critical
manpower shortages that forced the use of all available
labor in important defense industries; and the increasing
assertiveness of a group of well-educated blacks in
Washington who, with the support of dedicated white allies,
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carried the civil rights struggle into the federal bureaucy
and even into the hallowed halls of the White House.
Another important development between the two world
wars was the resurgence of the African American's
significant participation in the nation's political process.
There was a resurgence of political consciousness among
northern blacks especially, a development that enabled them
to serve as the balance of political power between the two
major parties. Consequently, led by the NAACP, African
Americans intensified their agitation for the adoption of
constructive policies by the federal agencies to ensure
equal treatment for themselves.
Nevertheless, although the nation had recovered
significantly from the Depression, and new employment
opportunities were being created, blacks remained in a
dismal economic state owing to the disproportionate loss of
jobs they had suffered after the stock market crash. The
mobilization of the nation's industrial machinery for
wartime production therefore gave blacks an unprecedented
opportunity to intensify their agitation for an end to
discrimination in programs supported by the federal dollar
and for equal opportunities in the work place./33
In 1940 Walter White began mobilizing the NAACP's
branches to end discrimination in the defense industry, but
A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping
Car Porters, became the driving force in that effort.
Supported by White, Randolph demanded that President
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Roosevelt take steps to end this discrimination or he would
lead a demonstration of 10,000 blacks in a march on
Washington. To stave off the march, Roosevelt issued
Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941 . The order created the
Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC) as an
administering agency to implement the directive barring
discrimination in war production activities.
The issuance of the order marked the launching of the
modern civil rights movement, because for the first time a
President had taken direct action to end discrimination and
to support the demands of African Americans for equal
opportunities. From that period, the central thrust of the
movement would be to expand the scope of presidential
leadership to protect the rights of blacks not only in the
work place but in every other area of activity./34
The FEPC agency expanded opportunities that had been
created in the New Deal for the increase in the number of
black federal executives. One of those executives was
Clarence Mitchell, Jr., a native of Baltimore, who as a top .
FEPC official, was a driving force from within the
government in the struggle to end discrimination in federal
employment.
The southerners killed the FEPC in 1946, but the
experience proved that discrimination could be eliminated.
So that same year Walter White hired Mitchell as labor
secretary in the NAACP Washington Bureau, which the
executive secre tary had created in 1 942 as a "watchdog in
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the national capital." White explained that this effort was
required because "so long as the overwhelming majority of
both white and Negro voters in the South were denied the
vote, the sole avenue of legislative remedy was the
Congress." Creation of the labor department was the NAACP's
first prograrrunatic attempt to address employment
discrimination and seek black economic equality for blac k s.
Mitchell

was totally dedicated to the FEPC idea, so

although the agency was dead, he kept alive the idea and
made it central to the NAACP's developing struggle for
passage of civil rights laws./35
Mitchell's primary goals were elimination of all forms
of employment discrimination, greater participation of
blacks in trade unions as well as an end to segregation and
discrimination by unions, passage of legislation creating
effective state and federal agencies such as the FEPC,
inclusion of nondiscrimination clauses in state and federal
laws covering government contracts, joining labor unions in
their struggle for legislation affecting their interests,
and expanding and improving vocational training
opportunities for blacks. While White conducted the NAACP's
broader political activities, such as to expand the range of
influential support for civil rights, Mitchell tailored his
program to utilize the Association's national branch
structure as a massive lobbying machine. In 1950, White, who
has been serving as the first director of the NAACP
Washington Bureau conferred that title on Mitc hell, giving
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him full authority to make the struggle for civil rights
laws central to the organization's work./36
In 1950 also, Thurgood Marshall who had succeeded
Houston as the NAACP's special counsel, began the final
phase of the organization's struggle to get the Supreme
Court to overturn the Plessy v . Ferguson "separate but
equal" doctrine.

Mitchell was as much inspired by the

NAACP's campaign to end segregation in the pub lic schools
through the courts as by the promise inherent in the power
of Congress to pass laws to protect the constitutional
rights of the racially oppressed./37
Given the extent of the southerners' control of
Congress, Mitchell realized that the NAACP had to obtai n the
full support of the President in addition to the courts to
achieve that goal. Mitchell worked closely with White to win
such support from President Truman, thus making the civil
rights struggle even more directly related to the conduct of
national politics. One of Mitchell's most persistent demands
was for Truman to issue an executive order to end
discrimination in federal employment in order to keep the
FEPC idea alive until Congress passed such a law. On July
26, 1948, Truman granted Mitchell his wish by issuing
Executive Order 9980 that prohibited such discrimination and
created a Fair Employment Board to review such
complaints./38
The NAACP also won Truman's support in several other
areas, but no action by the President was as important as
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his creation of the Committee on Civil Rights on December 5,
1946. A resurgence of lynchings and other forms of racial
violence had enabled Walt e r White to convince the President
that forthright leadership was needed to protect the rights
of blacks. Truman, faced with the worldwide
decolonialization movement and aggressive competition from
the Soviet Union during the developing cold war, was eager
to avoid racial embarrassments at home and wanted to portray
the United States as a truly democratic nation. /38
The Committee's report, To Secure These Rights, issued
the following year, was a remarkable document that gave
strength to the struggle for civil rights of all citizens
regardless of race, color, or national origin. "Civil
rights, after all," said the committee, "are statements of
aspirations, of demands which we make upon ourselves and our
society."
The committee noted that the national strength was
based on the pride Americans had in their freedom and
individual differences and that each citizen's aspirations
and achievements should be limited only by his or her own
talents and energies: "We can tolerate no restrictions upon
the individual which depend upon irrelevant factors such as
his race, his color, his

reli~ion

or the social position to

which he is born."/39
In short, 1947 was the year in which the national
government led by the President went on record as being
official opposed to racial segregation and stopped just
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short of declaring that blacks were entitled to equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet
the implication was very strong.
Th~

declaration that blacks were equal under the law

would be made by the Supreme Court in 1954 in its landmark
Brown v. Education decision reversing the "separate but
equal doctrine. The decision enabled the NAACP to expand its
political campaign based on the Fourteenth Amendment, and
this now became the basis of its strategy in Congress for
the passage of civil rights laws.

#
Mary White Ovington was one of the many voices i n the
early 1930s that expressed alarm that blacks were "at the
complete mercy o f the white man." Her suggested solution was
for blacks "to find some white group to join and assist"
because, by himself, he will only "get the leavings. " On e
solution she and many black activists suggested was for the
creation of biracial trade unionism. But it would require a
separate and sustained campaign to remove racial barriers in
the white unions./40
As the NAACP intensified its struggle in Congress for
the passage of civil rights laws, it also became clear the
to succeed it would have to mobilize the political forces of
its supporters in a lobbying coa lition . In addition to
individual volunteers, the NAACP early had begun enlisting
the support of other organizations in its crusade against
lynching. Walter White also showed how effective coalitions
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could be when the American Federation of Labor also
participated in the effort to block President Hoover's
nomination of Judge Parker to the Supreme Court.
As labor secretary in the Washington Bureau, Mitchell
began working to cement the NAACP's alliance with organized
labor by creating an advisory committee, half of whose
members were top leaders of the AFL and the Congress of
Industrial Organizations. His support group was in addition
to the q uadrennial mobilization of black voters that t h e
NAACP had initiated in 1940 to intensify pressure on the
executive branch, political parties, and p residential
candidates in response to complaints of i njust ices in the
military and civilian areas of the defense program./4 1
In 1943 and 1944, the NAACP expanded that support by
sponsoring a conference of leaders whose organizations
represented more than six millio n blacks. Mitchell recalled
that White "originated" the idea of getting groups like Phi
Beta Sigma and Alpha Phi Alpha fraternities and Phi Lambda
sorority to testify at congressional hearings . "Walter was
the greatest recruiter of support that you could want ," he
explained. "And whenever he had some idea of leg isl at i ve
objective, he would .

. go out and recruit various groups .

Any thing that had a crowd connected to it."/42
Those unprecedented political conferences first
produced in 1943 and then reaffirmed in 1944 a six-point
''Declaration of Negro Voters" that served as a yardstick for
measuring parties and candidates that "by words and deeds"
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showed their determination to work for full citizenship
status for thirteen million American Negroes to better the
lot of all disadvantaged people in this country." Their
voting strength in seventeen or more states with at least
281 electoral college votes gave blacks "the potential
balance of power in any reasonably close national electio n
and in many state and local elections," the conference of
twenty-seven representatives from twenty organizations said.
The concerns and agendas of those conferences were much
broader than that of Philip Randolph's single-issue National
Council for a Permanent Fair Employment Practice Committee,
which had been founded in 1942. The NAACP was one of the
most important members of the National Counc il ' s seventy
constituent organizations. On January 20, 1944, also, the
NAACP was represented at a meeting of the interracial
Conference Against Race Discrimination in the War Effort.
But this group cease d to e xist in December.
As in 1944, the people drafting the "Declaration of
Ne gro Voters" on March 27, 1948 were all black. They were
from Greek-letter, civic, political , and labor organizations
as well as from the Int e rnational Longshoremen's Association
and the National Maritime Union, the AFL, and the CI O. Their
non-partisan statement was resoundingly reaffirme d and
considerably strengthened on July 2 2 by a much-broade r
interracial Conference of Cooperating Organizations comp os e d
of 19 groups seeking to have a special session of the 80th
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Congress called by President Truman to pass civil rights
legislation.
In organ izing that "confe r ence, " White instructed
Wilkins to invite grou ps like the Southern Regional Counc il,
white women's churc h units s u c h as the Methodists , and
notable liberals to get as much as possib l e "decent wh ite
south ern sentiment to counterract the professional
southerners who are n ow so mu ch in the news." Wilk ins
apparent l y did not succeed in gett i ng any white southerners
to participate, but there was a fair representation of
established liberal groups .
Present we r e Pa ul Sifton of the United Au t omobi l e
Workers, a well known activist , Herman Edelsberg of t h e
Anti -Defamat ion League, B'nai B 'ri t h, Al ex Brooks of the
American Jewish Committee, Mary Baldinger of the American
Ci v il Liberties Union, Charles Zimmerman of the
International Lad i es Garment Workers Un i on , and Sanford Bolz
of the American Jewish Congress. While the earlier
mobilizations were specifical l y geared to awakening black
co ns c iousn e ss and t o punishing anti-civil rights l awmakers
at

the poll s , the group at the Ju l y meeting repr ese nted t h e

next step, following creation of the National Council for a
Perma nent FEPC, in the es t ablishment of a permanent c ivil
rights coalition . /43
The effectiveness of the NAACP 's politica l
mobilizations was well demonstrated espec i ally in the 1 948
election when Truman beat his Repub li can opponent Thomas
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Dewey by a h a ir with the h elp of bloc voting by blacks . But
even with a swing back to s trong Democratic major ities in
the House and Senate in 1949, the 81st Co ng r ess showed
itself no more likely t o pass FEPC legislation than its
predecessor.
The early coalition movement had exerted pressure
primarily on the Executive Branch . The NAACP now was fu lly
aware of how much more d i fficult it was -- compared to
getti ng President Truma n' s support on civil rights -- t o
mobilize pressure aga inst l awmake rs, especially senators,
from a national base than aga inst the Pres i dent . The NAACP
therefore shi fted its primary focus to Congress.
In tricate l y related to the NAACP ' s battle i n Congress
for a permanent FEPC was its struggle to c hange t h e Senate
filibuster Rule XXII , which the southerners were continui ng
to use to defeat the NAACP at every turn . The NAACP was as
unsuccessful in attempts to liberalize the r ul e , whi ch would
have helped its s uppo rt ers in the Senate to impose cloture
and limit debate, or the filibus t er , as it was in winning
passage of a FEPC l aw .
White had organ i zed a co n ference of 2 1 national
organizations that was held a t

th e Wendel l Willkie Memorial

Buil ding in New York on February 5, 1949, to work out an
effective and unified s tr ategy for the forthcoming h earings
by the Senate Ru l es Committee on c l oture and for removing
other obs tructi ons to the passage of c i vil rights
legislation i n Congress . That conference set u p a Joint
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Committee on Civil Rights to coordinate the work of
participating groups. It created a thirteen-member executive
committee as well as a legislative strategy committee to be
based in Washington./44
During that period, Mitchell further demonstrated his
belief that there was a common interest between blacks and
organized labor by vigorously supporting efforts to repeal
the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act. Although those efforts also
failed, Mitchell's advocacy of labor's interests before
congressional committees helped to cement his bond with the
labor movement.
The AFL, after initially opposing the struggle for a
permanent FEPC, by mid-1945 had adopted a more progressive
policy. Working through the National Council for a Permanent
FEPC, it began urging its affiliates to support this
movement. It was the CIO, however, that really showed a dee p
interest in the FEPC from the beginning, staging a lobbying
blitz in Washington during the first major push for a FEPC
law in September and October 1945. Though unsuccessful, this
effort revealed to Mitchell organized labor's resources and
power. Moreover, the growing white middle-class liberal
movement, which was also bitterly opposed to Taft-Hartle y ,
passionately identified with labor. That was another reason
why by joining forces with organized labor, Mitchell knew he
would one day fulfill his vision of getting Congress to pass
strong civil rights legislation.
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Mitchell also saw an opportunity in the developing
alliance to push for an end to segregation and
discrimination in the unions and thus attack the type of
institutional racism practiced by the National Labor
Relations Board. During the attempt to repeal the
Taft-Hartley Act in 1949, he urged Congress to include
safeguards against racial discrimination and segregation in
any legislation that was adopted. The proposals would have
prevented a union from being certified as the bargaining

.

agent if it segregated or discriminated against employees
because of race, religion, or national origin. Mitchell
called for decertification of any union conducting those
unjust practices; adoption of a principle that would not
have required an employer to bargain with a discriminating
union; and denial of the closed shop privilege to such
unions./45
During this period, also, Mitchell established
permanent bonds with liberal activists who would be among
his most important civil rights partners in the 1960s. In
addition to Joseph L. Rauh, a lawyer who was a founder of
the Americans for Democratic Action, they were Senator
Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, and Andrew J. Biemiller, an
old-line Socialist and Democratic Congressman from Wisconsin
who would later serve as the AFL-CIO's legislative
representative. The close alliance between the crusading
Mitchell and Rauh, especially, in many ways symbolized the
expanding quest for universal brotherhood./46
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By mid-1949, it was evident that if the
Republican-Dixiecrat alliance in Congress that had been
blocking civil rights legislation was to be beaten , the
NAACP had to expand its narrow black-labor coa li tion base to
involve other established black and white orga nizati ons as
well as grassroots people who voted.
Wilkins, in accordance with his res olution that the
NAACP annual convention

adopted that summer, held a

conference on the weekend of Octobe r 14 and 15 in New York
with NAACP branch r epre senta ti ve s as a first step in
mob ilizing gr as sroot support. Mitchell's wi fe Juanita was a
notable participant a t

the me e ting. The confere nce began

plans for the observance of " a civil liberties month,''
highlighted by meetings o n Ja nuar y 15-17, and which involved
NAACP branches more closel y in the civil rights legislative
program. The conference created an Emergency Ci vil Ri ghts
Committee of NAACP board members, branch, and state
conference presidents.
The conference invited othe r groups " to join with u s in
demanding affirmative action by the 8 lst Congress." Wilkins,
now acting executive secretary, was moving aggressively to
t ake command of th e legislative s truggle. An ailing White
had been granted a year ' s leave of absence after the
convention so he could take a year off t o get badly needed
rest.
The conference called on the NAACP's 1,600 branches and
29 state conferences to formulate plans for the observance
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of the National Civil Rights Mobilization. The branches were
ur9ed to send delegations to meet with members of Congress
during the Christmas recess and to solicit the cooperation
of trade unions, churches, fraternal groups and other
organizations as well as to hold mass meetings. They were
also urged to send delegates to the mobilization
Thirty-eight organizations , including most of the 25 members
of the Civil Liberties Clearinghouse in Washington, sent
representatives to the NAACP's second meeting on November
10.
The National Council for a Permanent FEPC, the f irst
interracial coalition, became a main force in the movement.
The delegates adopted the NAACP's planning outline, drew up
a policy and plan of operation for the NAACP 's state
conferences, and agreed to cosponsor the mobilization.
Wilkins was named general chairman. The 17-member steering
committee that was formed at the November 10 meeting
included representatives of the American Jewish Committee ,
the American Jewish Congress, the Catholic Interracial
Council, and Americans for Democratic Action .
That core group was expanded into a much larger
planning conference in December to include representatives
of 60 organizations, which made up the nucleus of a
permanent lobbying organization called the Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights that was organized in 1950.
Among the organizations represented at the January
National Emergency Civil Rights Mob ilization in Washington
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were three railroad car loads of NAACP members from Maryland
who had been brought over by Juanita and her mother Lillie
Carroll Jackson. Wilkins led a delegation to meet with
President Truman and obtain his support for the pending FEPC
bill in Congress.
Even though White was named chairman of the LCCR, the
moving force remained Wilkins. The creation of the coalition
represented one of his most important contributions to the
civil rights struggle. The mobilization was attended by
4,218 representatives of 100 national church, labor, civil
rights, minority group, fraternal, and professional
organizations from 33 states.
The size of the gathering surprised the NAACP and was
the best indication of how much the nation had been aroused
over the struggle for racial equali t y . The mobilization
launched an intensive lobbying campaign on Capitol Hill fo r
the passage of FEPC, anti-lynching, and other civil rights
measures. /47
The creation of LCCR was one of Wilkins's most
important contributions to the modern civil rights movement.
Mitchell's contributions were evident by the primary
emphasis that the mobilization gave to FEPC. The struggle
that he led in Congress for the creation of an agency to
protect blacks against discrimination in employment became
the foundation of the NAACP's strategy for passing civil
rights laws.
#
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The NAACP's legal and political programs were the twin
foundations of the modern civil rights movement, without
which the Supreme Court would not have overturned the
"separate but equal" doctrine and ruled segregation
unconstitutional, and the struggle in Congress for the
passage of civil rights laws could not have succeeded. In
conjunction with its work in the courts, the NAACP regarded
its political strategy as essential to getting the federal
government to uphold the Constitution and to protect the
civil rights of African Americans through executive action
and the support of its legislative struggle in Congress. The
NAACP was guided by a humanitarian and constitutional
philosophy that was rooted in the spirit of freedom and
equality upon which the nation was founded. It is against
the background of the NAACP's flagsh i p role that the work of
King and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference and of
the student organizations that worked in the South should be
judged.
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